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                                       I. Past and Current Views on Public Debt  
 
 
         Over many centuries, until the middle of the 20th Century, public debt had  
 
 not enjoyed a good  reputation.  Several famous historical figures, including  
 
 Cicero, George Washington, Napoleon and others, warned about the danger, to  
 
 countries  and to governments, of borrowing to finance public  spending.  
 
Economists shared those concerns. The concerns were based on  concrete  
 
 experiences of countries  that had got into difficulties, and not on abstract,  arm- 
 
chair theorizing.  
 
         In the year 43 BC Cicero wrote:  
 
“The national budget must be balanced. The public debt must be reduced and 
controlled. Payments to foreign governments must be reduced. The arrogance of the 
authorities must be moderated and controlled.  Payments to foreign governments 
must be reduced if the nation does not want to go bankrupt. 
 
        Seventeen centuries later, the views of David Hume, philosopher and economist, 
 
are  highly pertinent. At about the time when Adam Smith was working on The  
 
Wealth of Nations, Hume wrote that:  
 
     “It is very tempting to a minister to employ such an expedient [i.e. public 
borrowing], as it enables him to make a great figure during his administration 
without overburdening the people with taxes, or exercising immediate clamors 
against himself. The practice, therefore, of contracting debt will almost infallibly be 
abused in every government”. Hume, p. 92. 
 
      There were always and there continue to be situations that may justify the  
 
 expedient of public borrowing. It should be realized that in the past governments  
 
did not have the elaborate, modern tax administrations capable of collecting new  
 
taxes  within  relatively short periods of time, when a need arised. In the past, loans  
 
 could  be obtained more quickly, and often more easily, than taxes. There were also   
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the  reasons mentioned by Hume for preferring to rely on the “expedient’ of  
 
 borrowing.  Therefore, in spite of the opposition to public debt, many governments  
 
of the past did borrow, as we can read in Smith, 1776, and in Leroy- Beaulieu, 1888.  
 
        The historical figures mentioned above and most economists of the past would  
 
have supported ,  and today’s economists  would support public borrowing in  
 
particular  situations which would include: (a) fighting a war that threatened  the  
 
existence  of a country or the freedom of its citizens, as was the case during   
 
England’s war against Napoleon, when the public debt of that country increased  
 
sharply;  or (b) dealing with the consequences  of a great natural  disaster.  
 
       In more recent times, many economists would not oppose public  
 
  borrowing  to deal with a Great Depression, such as the one that in the 1930s   
 
  pushed the US unemployment rate to  25   percent of its labor force. That  
 
  experience  led John Maynard  Keynes to write  The General Theory of  
 
 Employment , Interest, and  Money,  the  book that contributed to changing the  
 
 attitude of many modern economists, though not all of them,  and many  
 
 policymakers  toward fiscal deficits, and, thus, toward increasing  public debts,  
 
 when countries  experience recessions and not only depressions. 
 
        Some economists might also argue that the financing of major public investment  
 
 programs,  “big push” in infrastructure building, concentrated into a short  
 
time span, could be added to the above  list. However, there would be disagreement  
 
 among  economists on whether routine public investment spending, spending that  
 
does not change much year after year, should be financed  by credit, rather than by  
 
 current  revenue,  as defenders of the so called golden rule, to estimate the size of  
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the fiscal deficit, have argued  that it should.  
 
         Not all what is called public investment is productive, and not all contributes   
 
to economic growth and to future public revenue. The public spending classified as   
 
investment is often inflated by “white elephants”, investments on “roads to  
 
nowhere”, and  expenses that may reflect corruption, rent seeking  or  
 
other  forms of opportunistic behavior.  See Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998. Corruption  
 
can significantly  inflate investment spending (by up to 40 percent, as it was  
 
reported (by the Italian Corte dei Conti in a 2014) to have happened in Italy, and as  
 
it has happened in other countries, including Brazil and Greece, in recent years.  
 
       This kind of “public investment” contributes neither to economic growth,  
 
 nor to future public revenue. However, it does inflate the public debt and the  
 
  future  costs of  servicing  the debt. It also reduces future economic growth.  
 
Furthermore, there continues to be a debate among accountants as to what kind of  
 
spending should be defined as public investment, thus allowing less scrupulous  
 
governments to classify some current expenses  as investment. The use of the  
 
golden rule encourages these actions. 
 
       Many modern economists would also agree that the fiscal deficits that arise  
 
from the automatic action of “built -in stabilizers”, during  genuine economic  
 
 recessions, could also be financed by debt. But many would strongly disagree with  
 
the view (pushed by some vocal economists in recent years) that,  when, for a  
 
variety  of reasons (including among them the very existence of a public debt  high  
 
enough to cause concern), the growth rate has fallen  below what they believe  is the  
 
long run trend, this  fall would justify a sustained fiscal injection. It ought to be also  
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recognized that the growth rates that had prevailed in several countries in the years  
 
before  the  financial crisis were probably inflated by the bubble that led to the  
 
crises. See Tanzi, 2015a. Therefore, the growth rate of those years should not be  
 
identified with the long run trend. 
 
       In all the above situations, a county, that in past years, had kept its public  
 
accounts in order, would find it easier and would be more justified,  to rely on public  
 
borrowing,  when that  need occurred,  than a country that had let its public account  
 
deteriorate, and that was already exposed to the potentially damaging  effects of a  
 
high public debt. This means that the initial conditions on the status of the fiscal  
 
accounts, at a given moment in time, are important in determining what fiscal policy  
 
is feasible and desirable . See Tanzi, 2015b.  
 
       The realization that there can be Great Depressions, or even Great Recessions,  
 
which  can lead to sudden and sharp falls in output and large increases in  
 
 unemployment  justify,  for many modern economists, fiscal policies that could   
 
create employment opportunities and might  prevent worse   outcomes.  This  
 
realization  led Keynes  in the 1930s to propose the use of time –limited,  
 
expansionary   fiscal policies, policies mainly associated with public spending on  
 
productive public works, financed by public borrowing. Keynes also theorized that,  
 
 through  the work of a fiscal multiplier, a given initial and time-limited fiscal  
 
expansion  would have a larger impact on aggregate  spending, and would help  
 
create  more employment and more output, than would have had the initial fiscal 
 
 stimulus, without the assistance of the multiplier.  
 
        That realization and the concern for high unemployment also led Keynes to  
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 state,  famously and perhaps a bit imprudently,  that, in the pursuit of their  policies,  
 
 governments  should  give priority to short run objectives, because, as he put it,   “in  
 
the long run we are all dead”. This statement implied that, if short run objectives  
 
(such as reducing a high unemployment rate) called for sharply increasing   a  
 
country’s  public debt, so be  it; worry about the short  run and ignore the long run!   
 
           The Keynesian statement about the long run has been often cited by  
 
economists  to recommend at times highly questionable policies. It has been  
 
interpreted  to suggest that the short run should always be the focus of counter- 
 
cyclical fiscal policies. As a consequence, counter-cyclical fiscal policy has tended to  
 
pay  relatively little attention to its long run implications, and especially to the  
 
implications  of high and  growing public debts, that often accompany it, and that  
 
may  become large or even   unsustainable, if the debt continues to accumulate, in  
 
the pursuit of presumably short -run objectives.  Some argue that this may be  
 
the case, today, in several countries, including the United States.   
 
           Except for Great Depressions, which fortunately have remained rare events, it  
 
can  be argued, and perhaps Keynes would have agreed, that the use of  
 
counter-cyclical  fiscal policy should be symmetric, over longer periods of time. In  
 
 other words, it should generate budget deficits during recessions, and budget  
 
 surpluses during good times. Therefore, it should not lead to the accumulation of  
 
 large  public debts over the longer run, that might become costly to service and  
 
that might make it more difficult for a country to use fiscal policy in future years,  
 
 when the need for it may  present itself.  
 
          Since the end of World War Two, the industrial countries have not fought  
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 great  wars. They have not experienced major natural disasters.  And they have 
 
 not  experienced  Great Depressions. Furthermore, they have not engaged in major 
 
 public  investment programs concentrated in short time periods, as for example  
 
has done China. If anything, spending for public infrastructure has been reduced in  
 
 many  countries, especially in recent decades. This has   led economic operators,  
 
 citizens and some economists  to complain about  the poor conditions of their  
 
 deficient,  antiquated, and unsafe  infrastructures. Furthermore, the countries have  
 
had far more efficient tax administration capable of collecting taxes than in the past. 
 
          In spite of the above experiences, public debt has grown in most industrial  
 
Countries; in some it has reached historical records. In spite of  these  levels , some  
 
economists have been urging several industrial countries, to keep borrowing, to  
 
increase spending and to subject their large existing public  debt to benign neglect.  
 
This course of action would, in their views, stimulate the economies, while they  
 
would take  advantage of the low interest rates that the central banks have made  
 
possible in recent years.  
 
 
                                 II. “New Keynesian” Views on Fiscal Policy  
 
 
         Some economists have recommended, and some governments have adopted 
 
 policies  broadly described as  “Keynesian”, or “New- Keynesian”, although  
 
it is not certain that they would have received  Keynes’ own stamp of approval,  if he  
 
 had  been alive today. These policies reflect the belief, firmly held by some highly  
 
 vocal  economists, that with enough public spending any country can prosper,  can  
 
 grow  and live happily ever after,  regardless of structural or other obstacles   
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that might  be restraining its growth.  
 
        A change in a paradigm often starts with a change in the meaning of some terms.  
 
This has happened in recent years in the discussion of fiscal policy, especially in the  
 
years  after  the beginning of the Great Recession. Terms such as “austerity”,   
 
“recession”,  “growth” and others have been subjected to a non transparent but  
 
significant  massaging of their meanings. For example “austerity” now no longer  
 
means the “pursuit of an austere  practice”, as the dictionary would put it, but, it  
 
means for governments, not continuing to spend lots of money  that they do not   
 
have.  Or, take the term ‘recession”.A country as the USA, that is growing at more  
 
than two percent annual rate and that has a five percent unemployment rate, is  
 
described as being  “deeply depressed”. “Growth policies” are no longer policies that  
 
increase the potential of an economy to grow in the long run. Rather they refer to  
 
policies in which governments sharply increase public spending of any kind,  
 
productive or unproductive. These new definitions have accompanied the  
 
promotions of new theories associated with fiscal and monetary policies.. 
       
         Realistic obstacles to the growth of countries may include some of a structural  
 
nature and others of a more psychological nature. The latter   that may be created by  
 
various kinds of uncertainty that changes in some policies,  or some future  
 
events  (in interest rate, taxes, regulations, or developments in other countries),   
 
including large and growing  public debt overhangs, can create, in countries where  
 
citizens are already highly taxed, the interest rates have been pushed to unusual,  
 





       The implicit belief of the  “New- Keynesian” paradigm seems to be that, very  
 
large,  fiscal multipliers exist at this time and that the very low borrowing costs,  
 
made possible  by central banks policies, can make public spending perform  
 
economic  miracles. A high aggregate demand, sustained by large fiscal deficits, can  
 
significantly  raise a country’s growth rate ,especially the growth rates of  “deeply  
 
depressed” economies, including that of the  United States. It is also believed that  
 
the high levels of public debt, that now exist in many countries, and the additions to  
 
those  levels caused by borrowing to support high spending would not create future  
 
obstacles because the anticipated high growth rates would, organically  and  
 
painlessly,  melt the debt over the longer run.  
 
      Given these assumption , it is believed to be counter-productive, or even  
 
“stupid”, as Joe Stiglitz put it in a 2015 column, to worry about fiscal deficits  and   
 
public debts,  through policies of  “austerity”, at a time when the growth rates are  
 
still modest, there are workers still looking for jobs, and the borrowing costs to  
 
governments are very low.  Policies of “austerity”, presumably those adopted in the  
 
more recent years by the USA, the UK, Germany, Italy Spain  and other countries , or  
 
forced on countries such as Greece, Portugal, and others,, are considered  
 
counterproductive and not smart. 
 
       The large space that the media gives to a few, highly vocal economists, who  
 
have assumed the role of public intellectuals and  who hold the views described  
 
above,  gives the impression that those views  now reflect those of the majority of  
 
economists.  However, many leading economists, including several past or recent  
 
Nobel Prize winners, do not share, or would not have shared, those  
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views if they had been still alive today. Hayek, Friedman, Buchanan, and living  
 
Nobels, such as Lucas, Sargent, Phelps, Fama,  Kydland, Prescott, Sims and others  
 
hold, or held, widely different views.   
 
         As a footnote, similar advice had been given to, and had been followed  by,  
 
Japan, in the 1990s --see, Tanzi, 2008, pp. 122- 125-- with results that  have  become  
 
all too evident. An evaluation of the recent Japanese experience and of future  
 




          As a result of the new theories, research in the fiscal area has become more and  
 
more creative ,and less and less intuitive or convincing, in recent years, to those who  
 
do not share the same  paradigm. Paul Krugman, and to a more guarded extent Larry 
 
 Summers, and some others have argued that traditional or orthodox rules of  
 
economics may no longer apply, when economies are “deeply depressed”, as they  
 
believe  the American, the European and the Japanese economies are at this time,   
 
and when “liquidity traps” are present, as they also seem to believe that there are. In  
 
these  circumstances, fiscal policies that stimulate demand for a sustained period of  
 
time  are assumed to be extraordinarily growth generating. 
 
          Empirical studies, broadly, if not always precisely, in line with the above  
 
thinking,  have generated research results that to more orthodox economists seem  
 
 highly  questionable  and less and less understandable. More orthodox economists 
 
  have had increasing  difficulties in understanding the channels and the  
 
mechanisms that are expected to create the huge multipliers believed to exist, and  
 




                          III. Public Debt and Its Impact on Economic Activity 
 
 
       Various papers, some by academic economists and some, more surprisingly,  
 
by economists at some international institutions, especially at the IMF, have  
 
advocated  expansionary  fiscal policies and slower paces of fiscal consolidation,  by  
 
countries with high fiscal deficits and large public debts, including the United States  
 
the UK and other countries and have complained about policies of “austerity” as  
 
they define the term.  
 
        At the end of 2008, and at the beginning of the financial crisis, some high  
 
level  economists at the IMF, including the heads of two important departments  
 
(Fiscal and Research), set the tone for the policies that the economists at IMF would   
 
recommend   to advanced countries to fight the crisis. In an important paper, they  
 
called  for the adoption of large, expansionary,  and sustained fiscal  
 
policies. The fiscal packages, to be adopted, by countries that had already   
 
large  fiscal deficits and high public debts, had to be not only “large” but also  
 
“sustained” in time.  
 
         Other economists echoed that call and later complained that the fiscal stimuli  
 
packages, that various countries introduced and that in 2009 sharply  increased  
 
their  fiscal deficits, at times to extraordinarily and clearly  unsustainable levels, had  
 
not been large enough and/or  had not been sustained long enough. In the G7  
 
countries the fiscal deficits  in 2009 averaged 10 percent of GDP. In 2010 they were  
 
still 8.8 percent of GDPs. In several countries, they were even larger than 10 percent  
 
of GDPs. See IMF Fiscal Monitor, Oct. 2015. 
 
 12 
       The fiscal stimulus packages introduced in 2009 had been withdrawn when the  
 
money  budgeted for the fiscal expansion had been spent. The deficits, that existed  
 
after  that  money had been spent, were still very large. In the G7 countries they  
 
were still over 6 percent of GDP in 2012, but these deficits reflected “austerity” in  
 
the view of some economists.  See Tanzi, 2015a.  
 
       The papers that have been part of the pro-spending literature cannot be  
 
 discussed   in any details here. We shall report some statistics on public  
 
debts  and some estimates of “fiscal space” that some economists believed that  still  
 
exist and that should  be used byadvanced countries. These economists believe that 
 
the (in their opinion) ample fiscal space would allow many of these countries to  
 
keep financing  large  fiscal  deficits, while easily servicing  their  public debts. In  
 
their view this policy would  promote “growth”. 
 
        We shall organize our discussion around an IMF staff paper, co-authored by  
 
three economists from the Research Department of that institution. It should be  
 
mentioned  that these staff papers do not necessarily reflect the official  
 
 positions of the IMF, but the personal views of the authors. However,  especially  
 
when they are issued by major departments,  they influence the way that the media  
 
and the governments  assess the IMF current thinking.  
 
          In the recent writings that have criticized policies of “austerity”,  “austerity”   
 
seems to describe  the policies of countries that did not maintain the  
 
fiscal deficits at the  extraordinarily high levels of 2009-2010, the years immediately  
 
after the financial crisis, when the stimulus packages had made the deficits very  
 
large. The criticisms seem to imply that the more prudent or more orthodox,  
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policies  that followed the introduction of the large “fiscal packages” , even though  
 
they were still associated with significant deficits and rising public debts, were too  
 
restrictive.  In the view of the critics the countries should have maintained the large  
 
fiscal  stimuli,  and several countries  should now adopt more expansionary policies:  
 
(a) regardless of the current  levels  of public spending (that for most countries have  
 
remained  very high, and well above that in  2007 in real terms;  (b) despite the  
 
record levels of public debt; and (c) despite the expectation in many countries that  
 
the public debt will continue to rise and that in some might become unsustainable  
 
        As interpreted in the 2015 Fund study mentioned earlier, the current fiscal and  
 
economic  situations  of many countries would justify and would allow them to  
 
introduce  much additional and sustained, expansionary fiscal  action.  These policies  
 
would be different from the time- limited packages , theorized by Keynes, expected  
 
to operate through the action of reasonably –estimated, fiscal multipliers.  
 
       Very large fiscal multipliers are now assumed — see, DeLong  and  Summers,  
 
2012--- and they operate over much longer time periods –see, Blanchard and Leigh,  
 
2013. Thus, in the views of the economists that are behind these new theories, the  
 
fiscal  expansion policies need to be sustained for much longer periods. It is obvious  
 
that these economists believe that we are now  in a very different fiscal world,  one  
 
where  past rules no longer apply.  
 
         Perhaps, because of the popularity that some of these views have acquired in  
 
some  quarters, and because of the political attraction of public borrowing, that  
 
David Hume had recognized three centuries ago, the world risks drowning in an 
 
 enormous  pool of public and private debt, especially if the proposed policies should  
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not generate the fast rate of growth that those who propose them hope they  
 
will generate.  
 
        In a 2015 Report, Mckinsey & Company, have provided useful statistics on  
 
public  debt  in  the  world.  Some of these  statistics  are reported in Table 1, below.   
 
The combined   level of public and private debt in the world has never  been so high.   
 
As the Mckinsey Report states:  “ Government debt has risen by $ 25 trillion [sic]  
 
since 2007 and will continue to rise in many countries, given current economic  
 
 fundamentals”.  Italics added. $19 trillion of that total was in advanced countries. 
 
        The Mckinsey Report warns that  “high debt levels… have historically placed a  
 
drag   on growth  and [have] raised the risk of financial  crises that [can} spark deep,  
 
  economic  recessions”. In a recent book, the author of this paper argued that  
 
 large  and growing disequilibria in the public finances of many European countries,  
 
some  hidden by questionable and non transparent fiscal accounts, or by faulty data,  
 
made the  financial crisis (imported into Europe from the United States), after the  
 
American, sub–prime,  fcrisis  exploded, much more severe than it would have been  
 
if the fiscal accounts had been in order. . For a discussion of   the “massaged” fiscal  
 
data in theEuropean countries, see Tanzi, 2013, chapter 6, and also Irwin, 2015. 
 
        It should be recalled that neither the Federal Reserve System nor other official,  
 
economic   institutionshad  predicted the financial crisis of 2007-2008; or, for that  
 
matter,  the 1997-1999 crisis  in Southeast Asia. This failure should be a warning for  
 
what  could happen in future years, if another crisis should appear suddenly and  
 
if it needed to be met by governments’ fiscal actions, and by central banks’  
 
expansionary   monetary action, when  the public debts are at historic high  
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and the levels  and interest rates have remained at extremely low levels. Significant  
 
 increases in interest  rates are expected in the future.   They will make the existing  
 




           High public debt may depress growth through various channels. The most  
 
direct  channel is that servicing the public debt costs money that may need to be  
 
diverted  from public spending that could have been used to finance  public  
 
 infrastructure.  This relationship was first theorized and empirically tested in a 
 
 paper by Tanzi and Chalk, published in 2000 by the European Commission.  That  
 
relationship  has been confirmed by later studies. For Example, the mentioned IMF  
 
paper by Ostry at al,  on p.15,  reported the existence of a “ strong  negative  
 
relationship  between public debt … and public investment”.  Another IMF paper by  
 
Chudik, et al. ,  2015, has also found “ significant negative long-run effects of public  
 
debt  buld-up on output growth”, p.1.   
 
     A few years ago some papers by Reinhart et al. argued that there was a threshold  
 
of around 90 percent in the debt /GDP relationship, at which the public  debt started  
 
to have a negative impact on growth.  That argument elicited much controversy. The  
 
importance of such a threshold has not been confirmed by other studies, and it is  
 
not likely that such a threshold exists. The main reason is that not all public debts  
 
are born equal and the cost of servicing  similar public debt levels can be very  
 
different in different countries. There are several reasons for this affirmation:  
 
       First, there is the question of the use to which the borrowed money was put  
 
when the debt was contracted . If it was used to finance productive public  
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investments, its  impact on growth would be expected to be different from what it  
 
would  be if it financed, say,  higher salaries for public employees.  
     
      Second, the average interest rate on the total debt of countries can differ  
 
 significantly, making the burden of the debt widely different, even when the  
 
debt/GDP ratios are similar. 
 
         Third, the maturity of the debt is also important and different countries tend to  
 
have different maturities. A debt with a long maturity and a low average interest  
 
rate is much less burdensome and less risky than an equivalent debt with short  
 
 maturity  and high interest cost. A debt with long maturity will also be sensitive to 
 
 the rate of unexpected inflation, if the debt is in domestic currency. The high debt  
 
accumulated  by the USA before and during World War two, that carried low  
 
interest rates, because of the low inflation when it was contracted,  was significantly  
 
eroded by the higher inflation that prevailed in the years after the war.  
 
        Forth, the debt can be contracted in the currency of the country, or in the  
 
currencies of other countries. While a country can inflate itself out of a domestic  
 
debt, as did Argentina and other Latin American countries in the 1980s,  it cannot  
 
inflate  itself out of a debt contracted in a foreign  currency. Different countries have  
 
relied differently on foreign debt.  
 
        Finally, the tax treatment of interest incomes received by the holders of the  
 
debt  can also play a role. That treatment varies significantly among countries. 
 
           Because of the above reasons, it seem highly unlikely that a specific threshold  
 
could be established at  which the debt/GDP ratio begins to affect negatively a  
 
country’s  growth rate.   Such a threshold, if it existed, would be different for  
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different  countries; it would also be different over time for the same country.  
 
It seems less controversial that the higher is the debt to the GDP ratio in a country,  
 
the greater would be the negative impact of public debt on economic growth.   
 
          Some economists have challenged or qualified the latter conclusion.   
 
For example the cited paper by Ostry al., states that despite the negative impact,  
 
that it reports,  of high debt on public investment  and on growth  “…the analytical  
 
framework  implies that, in general it is better (for growth and welfare) to live with  
 
high  debt than to try to reduce it through  distortionary taxation” . Ibid.  While this  
 
may  be true,  “distortionary taxation” may not be the only or the desirable way to  
 
reduce a high debt in most countries. A better way would be to reduce unproductive   
 
spending, of which there is often a lot in many  countries.  
 
      Some countries that in the recent past cut public spending sometimes by very  
 
large shares of GDP, to deal with high and growing public debts, did very well in the  
 
future years. Tanzi, 2011, p.235, reported that public spending was reduced by very  
 
large percentages of GDP, in Sweden, Canada, Ireland, Norway  and some other  
 
countries in the past two decades. . They all performed remarkably well in the years  
 
after the spending was cuts. 
 
        High public debt may reduce growth through channels other than the  
 
  impact  on public  investment and on tax levels .  See the papers by Reinhart et al,  
 
2012, and  by Cecchetti at  al. 2011. In particular high public debt may  depress  
 
growth by creating concerns, in the minds of investors and consumers, about the  
 
long run  sustainability  of fiscal policy and the increasing likelihood of financial  
 
crises . Some recent studies have shown that economic uncertainty   has  
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grown a lot in recent  years, especially in the years when fiscal policy became more  
 
active  and public debt grew. See Baker, Bloom and  Davis, 2013.   
 
       Even a  casual look at the countries with high public debt will indicates that they  
 
have not been blessed by high growth rates. For example both Italy and Japan  
 
stopped growing when their ratios of debt to GDP reached high levels. Of course it is  
 
always difficult to determine cause and effect in these relationships.   Some  
 
economists have argued that it was the slow economic  growth that led to the  
 
increase in the Debt/GDP ratios. 
                                     
 
                                 IV. Debt Statistics and Future Prospects  
 
  
         The Mckinsey Report listed 23 countries, which included all the large 
 
 Industrial countries, that in 2014, had ratios of total (public and private) debt to  
 











































Change in Gov. 
Debt/GDP 
(2007-2014) 
Japan 400 246 0 63 
Ireland 390 108 106 93 
Singapore 382 99 193 22 
Portugal 358 130 59 83 
Belgium 327 107 124 34 
Netherlands 325 68 158 38 
Greece 317 177 0 70 
Spain 313 98 118 92 
Denmark 302 45 197 22 
Sweden 290 44 188 1 
France 280 96 117 38 
Italy 259 132 0 47 
United Kingdom 252 89 133 50 
Norway 244 28 246 -16 
Finland 238 59 172 29 
U.S.A. 233 105 165 36 
South Korea 231 36 241 15 
Austria 225 84 157 23 
Canada 221 88 150 16 
Australia 213 34 215 23 
Germany 188 75 168 17 
 
Sources: Columns 2 and 4, from Mckinsey  Global Institute, Debt and (Not Much)  
Deleveraging, February 2015, Table on page 4. 
Column 3, from IMF, Fiscal Monitor, Oct. 15, 2015. 
Column 5, from  Jonathan D. Ostry, Atish R. Ghosh, and Raphael Espinoza, 




as it was learned in recent years in countries such as Ireland, Spain, Iceland, Cyprus,  
 
United States and one some others, over the years ,private debt has shown an  
 
increasing tendency to become public debt, in times of crisis. At the same time,  
 
more  and more public debt has been parked in the balance sheets of the central  
 
banks. This represents a radical change, the long run consequences of  
 20 
 
 which  are difficult to predict at this time.  
 
       While the data cited above are just statistical facts, as already mentioned, the  
 
attitude  of some economists  has become less antagonistic to public debt, than  
 
it had been in the past. Some have even converted public debt from a sin into a  
 
virtue, under certain circumstances. Governments that do not increase their public  
 
borrowing and their public spending, presumably to promote what these  
 
economists call growth, are criticized. Central banks have been facilitating this  
 
behavior  by reducing and keeping low the cost of short term borrowing. Some  
 
economists would even push the rates into sharply negative territory.   
 
         Years ago, attitudes that,  at least among economists,  were less extreme than  
 
the ones reported above had led the great Austrian economist  Ludwig von Mises   to  
 
remark, in response to Keynes’  comment about the importance of the short run,  
 
that the trouble with the excessive focus on the short run, and with the short run  
 
promotion of public spending and borrowing, was that “…nearly  all of us outlive  
 
the short run and… spend decades paying for the easy money  orgy of a few years”.  
 
For sure the Greeks, the Japanese, the Portuguese, the Spaniards, the Italians, and  
 
the  citizens  of several other highly-indebted countries have discovered, or some  
 
will discover,  the relevance of von Mises’  comment.  See Mises, 205, p. 130. 
 
         Concerns and antipathy vis -a -vis the accumulation of public debt had  
 
 persisted  until the  time when the Keynesian views of the positive role that fiscal 
 
  deficits could play to fight recessions  became popular in the 1940s. There are  
 
many countries, today, with high public debts, and several  advanced   countries  
 
have public debts that exceed 100 percent of their GDPs.  The latest IMF statistics of  
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public debts, reported as Column 3 of Table 1, indicate that in 2014 the public debts  
 
of general governments, as percentages of  GDPs, were: 246 for Japan; 177 for  
 
Greece; 132 for Italy; 130 for Portugal; 107 for Belgium; 108 for Cyprus; 105 for the  
 
United States; and 108, for Ireland.  Several other countries (Canada, France,  
 
Singapore, Spain and the UK) , had Debt/GDP shares close to 100 percent. See IMF  
 
Fiscal Monitor, October, 2015. These debts continued to grow in 2015. 
 
       Clearly attitudes vis -a -vis public debt have changed over the years, while the  
 
supply of credit, to governments that want to borrow, has become progressively  
 
more elastic, because of globalization of financial markets, the growth of shadow  
 
banking,  the high saving rate of  China,  and the novel, and more accommodating    
 
policies  of central banks.  
 
         In recent years the policies of central banks have made it increasingly  
 
 more  difficult to distinguish fiscal policies  from monetary policies, because of the  
 
 experimentation  by central banks with “Quantitative Easing” and with  
 
other  highly unorthodox  and novel policies. Monetary policy has become  
 
increasingly  more dependent on fiscal developments, after the campaign by  
 
economists  for central bank political independence. An increasing   share  
 
of government debt has ended in the balance sheets of the central  banks. 
 
         Some recent economic literature has attempted to define an optimal public  
 
debt   level, or a safe level of debt, naturally assumed to be far above zero, and  
 
recognizing  that such a level is “very difficult to pin down precisely in  practice”. See  
 
Ostry et al.p.1.  That literature has suggested that debt levels fall into three zones: a  
 
green zone,  a yellow zone and  a red zone. For green zone countries “ reducing   
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debt … is likely to be normatively  undesirable as the costs involved [in reduced  
 
output] will be larger than the  resulting benefits”. See Ostry ar al. , p.1.   
 
        According to this methodology only four countries (Japan, Italy, Greece and  
 
Cyprus) are in the red zone and face inflexible debt limits. These countries should  
 
refrain  from adding to their public  debt levels. The countries in the yellow zone  
 
have fiscal space that they can still use, but must exercise some caution. Those in the  
 
green  zone, that includes most counties, have large fiscal space, as large as 100 or 
 
 even  200 percent of GDP. One can only wonder at these estimates. For example is it  
 
reasonable  to assume that the current fiscal space of Belgium is 124 percent of GDP,  
 
that of Spain is 118 percent, and that of France is 117 percent? What would  happen  
 
if all the countries in the table decided to use the estimated fiscal space? 
 
            We know that all the countries in Table 1 will face significant age-related  
 
public spending   in the coming years. Some have large, unfunded,  pension liabilities  
 
that do not show in the official  public debts statistics. These contingent liabilities, if  
 
added to the official estimates of the public debt would raise the debts considerably.  
 
Also the interest rates that have prevailed in recent years have been very low, in  
 
part because of the interest rate policies, and in part  because of the large saving  
 
rates in particular countries and especially in China. These favorable factors are  
 
likely to change in future years, creating a far less -favorable environment for  
 
countries with high public debts. For many of these countries the maturity of the  
 
debt is relatively short.  
 
           Table 2 provides some data, estimated by Standard and Poor a few years ago,  
 
on  the future impact of aging on public spending in many industrial countries,  
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under  the laws when the estimations were made. The table shows that all the  
 
countries in the table will  be severely affected by aging,  some  more than others.  
 
Several countries will need as much as ten or more percentage points  of GDPs in  
 
public spending  to cover the increasing costs of aging by 2050. A large proportion  
 
of  those  living today will be still around in 2050; so that, 2050 does not reflect the  
 
time “when we are all dead”.  
 
           Over the past two decades there has been increasing resistance on the part of  
 
the citizens of OECD counties to pay higher taxes. Revenue statistics provided by the  
 
OECD indicate that the highest shares of taxes into GDPs were achieved in the  
 
decade of the 1990s.  Almost no country increased its tax level by any significant  
 
amount  after the end of the 1990s.  Therefore, the obvious question must be:  
 
how  will the countries be able  to, both, service the (current or the even higher)  
 
future public debts, at likely higher interest rates, while, at the same time,  
 
significantly increasing  public spending,  in some cases by very large amounts, to  
 
cover costs of aging populations, costs related to needed infrastructure, costs due to  
 
global warming, and other costs. This is the question that those who are currently  
 


























Japan 18.8 22.1 26.7 7.9 
Ireland 12.1 16.2 22.0 9.9 
Singapore n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Portugal 20.8 24.4 29.9 9.1 
Belgium 21.8 28.8 32.8 11.0 
Netherlands 16.1 23.3 28.2 12.1 
Greece 18.6 26.6 36.6 18.0 
Spain 16.9 21.0 28.6 11.7 
Denmark 18.3 23.2 24.5 6.2 
Sweden 21.6 25.2 27.4 5.8 
France 24.9 29.1 31.9 7.0 
Italy 22.4 26.0 28.8 6.9 
United 
Kingdom 
15.7 20.1 23.7 8.0 
Norway 18.2 25.0 29.1 10.9 
Finland 19.5 26.6 28.8 9.3 
U.S.A. 10.8 15.1 18.5 7.7 
South Korea 5.8 10.8 17.2 11.4 
Austria 21.5 26.2 29.6 8.1 
Canada 14.1 19.1 22.0 7.9 
Australia 9.6 11.1 14.4 4.8 
Germany 20.0 25.0 29.5 9.5 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s Global Credit Portal, “Global Aging 2010:An 




                                             Concluding Remarks 
 
 
        This paper has dealt with the rise of public debt in recent years in  
 
industrial  countries and with the push on  the part of some vocal  
 
 economists,  both in academia and in some international institutions,  
 
to  increase  public spending and to  abandon what they call “austerity”,  in  
 
the belief that this policy will promote growth, and not just at best a  
 





       The paper has discussed how, over the long run, attitudes vis -a -vis  
 
public  borrowing changed and became more relaxed; and how some  
 
economists  came to see higher public debt as almost a  kind of miracle cure  
 
that  would increase economic growth, not just in the short run but also in  
 
the long run, through  highly questionable channels. The paper has provided  
 
some  data that indicate how much the public debts have become a current  
 




       It may be instructive to conclude this paper by citing from Adam Smith’s  
 
The Wealth of Nations. 
 
       “All states…have  on  some occasion played this very juggling trick [ of 
replacing tax revenue with borrowing]” p.883. “When national debts have 
once been accumulated to a certain degree, there is scarce… a single instance 
of their having been fairly and completely paid. The liberation of public 
revenue, if it has ever been brought about at all, has always been brought by 
bankruptcy: sometimes an avowed one, but always by a real one, though 
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